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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
damages of $10.00 per day for delay in the completion of a building,
the court said that if the purpose of the provision is merely to secure
performance, and damages can be readily computed and the amount
in excess of the damage is unreasonable, it is a penalty regardless of
the language used. But a penalty is defined as a promise to pay a larger
sum on default of a promise to pay a lesser sum, or, where the sum to
be paid on default is greater than the defaulted sum or the entire debt.2"
Thus the result in Schneider v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Com-
pany21 where the contract called for part payment and retention in case
of default. After plaintiff paid $24,400.00 on the contract price of
$89,600.00, he defaulted. Notwithstanding that defendant had no ac-
tual damages, plaintiff could not recover. The court said:
"We see no theory, however, upon which a written contract
... can be set so aside and disregarded on behalf of one admit-
tedly in default thereunder and such defaulting party neverthe-
less be permitted to assert an independent right to all or part
of that which was paid under and pursuant to the terms of such
contract, and especially so when such payment, as it was here
distinctly and expressly agreed to by the parties, should be for-
feited as liquidated damages in case of just such a default as
it is here conceded existed."
It is the opinion of the writer that the court in that case stated the
logical and reasonable rule that should be applied in these cases.
KENNETia H. HAYES
Sales-Implied Warranties in the Sale of Secondhand Goods - Plain-
tiff, a Deleware Corporation, entered into a contract to sell a cheese
manufacturing plant including all equipment to the defendant, a Wis-
consin cooperative. A used boiler was included as part of the equip-
ment but conveyed on a separate bill of sale. In an action to recover
the balance of the purchase price the defendant claimed a set-off for
expenses incurred in repairing the boiler. Defendant alleged that the
plaintiff's agent orally warranted the fitness of the boiler for the pur-
poses to which the plaintiff knew it would be put. Prevented from
showing any express warranty by the parol evidence rule, defendant
sought to establish implied warranties on the basis that plaintiff knew
the intended use of the boiler and the defendant relied on the plaintiff's
skill and judgment as to its suitability for such use. Held: Secondhand
goods are not excluded as a matter of law from the operation of" the
Uniform Sales Act. § 15 (1).' Standard Brands v. Consolidated
Badger, 89 F.Supp. 5 (D.C., E.D., Wis. 1950).
19 108 Wis. 365, 84 N.W. 490 (1900).2 0Minn Billiard Company v. Schwab, 179 Wis. 129, 190 N.W. 836 (1922).
- 196 Wis. 56, 219 N.W. 370 (1928).
'Wis. Stats., 121.15 (1949), "Subject to the provisions of this act and of any
statute in that behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the
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The federal court for the eastern district of Wisconsin having de-
cided in advance of the Wisconsin courts that secondhand goods are
not excluded from the operation of the sales act, the question arises as
to whether Wisconsin courts will decide similarly. In view of the evi-
dent sense of the statute,2 the provision made for uniform interpreta-
tion,3 and the apparent uniformity of opinion in other states as to the
construction of the sales act on this point,4 an affirmative answer seems
indicated. In the event of such a decision, many questions will arise
in the minds of both buyers and sellers of used goods; all ot which
can be resolved into the simple question, how will such a holding affect
me?
In order to ascertain the effect of such a holding, the first problem
to consider is, in what sales will the law imply this warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose? An examination of the wording of the
statute5 reveals that in order to establish implied waranties of fitness
the purchaser must not only show that he made known to the seller
the particular purpose for which the goods were required, but also
that he relied on the seller's skill and judgment as to their suitability
for such purpose. Thus where the purchaser makes the selection no
warranty can be implied, for there can be no reliance on the seller's
skill and judgment. Similarly, where the seller is not informed as to
the particular purpose for which the goods are required by the buyer
there can be no implied waranty. In sales of new and used goods, both
requirements must be met before the law will imply this warranty.
A seller of either new or used goods not wishing the sale to come under
the act can refuse to make the selection; or, if he does make the selec-
tion, he can word the contract so as to negative any implied warranties.0
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a con-
tract to sell or sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods
shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
2 Wis. Stats., 121.15 (1949), embraces "goods supplied under a contract to sell
or sale." Wis. Stats., 121.76 (1949), defines goods as, "all chattels personal
other than things in action or money." (There seems to be no exclusion of
secondhand goods in the statutory definition of the property covered by the
statute).
3 Wis. Stats., 121.74 (1949), "This act shall be so interpreted and construed, as
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states
which enact it."
4151 A.L.R. 463.
5 Supra, Note 1.
G Wis. Stats., 121.71 (1949), "Where the right, duty or liability would arise
under a contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negative
or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the
parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the con-
tract or sale." But Wis. Stats., 121.15 (6) (1949) must be considered, "An ex-
press warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied
1951]
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As to the transactions covered by the act, the law as applied to used
goods will be the same as that applied to new goods.
Incumbent upon the purchaser, however, in addition to establishing
the above two requirements, is the requirement that he show his re-
liance was justifiable.7 Reliance under the sales act is treated as-a ques-
tion of fact, with inspection and opportunity of inspection treated as
important but not conclusive elements to be considered.6 In sales of
secondhand goods the very fact that the article is secondhand might
tend to show reliance unreasonable,9 but some cases have held that
the fact that the seller previously used the article and was therefore
familiar with its capabilities is an important element in showing justifi-
able reliance on the part of the purchaser."" The seller's occupation
is a further element to be considered, for although he is liable "whether
he be a grower or manufacturer or not,""1 his occupation has important
bearing upon the reasonableness of the buyer's reliance.22 The customs
of the trade also bear upon the reasonablness of the reliance, and may
serve to establish an implied warranty. 3 The fact that the goods are
used also has an important bearing on reasonableness of the buyer's
reliance, and for this reason the law applied to sales of new goods
cannot be applied without exception to sales of used goods.
Further divergence can be found with respect to the suitability
of the goods to the particular purpose. The general view is that so long
as the goods are reasonably fit, there is no breach. 4 But the fitness of
used goods to the particular purpose may not be the same as with
new goods.15
Not only has the purchaser of a used article the burden of showing
that the article was not reasonably suited for the particular purpose,
but he also faces problems as to the duration of the warranty. In
Marmet v. People's Coal Co.,:' involving implied warranties of fitness
Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) and cases discussed therein which show the
extent to which courts have gone to find implied warranties.
under this act unless inconsistent therewith." See Bekkevoldt v. Potts, 173
7151 A.L.R. 465; wrLasToN, SALES Acr § 234 (3d ed. 1948).
sWis. Stats., 121.15 (3) (1949), "If the buyer has examined the goods, there
is no implied warranty as regards defects which such examination ought to
have revealed ;" WIUaST'ON, SALES Act § 234 (3d ed. 1948).
9151 A.L.R. 465.
10 Dremar Mining Co. v. Morris Ravine Mining Co., 33 Cal. App. (2d) 492,
92 P. (2d) 424 (1939).l Supra, Note 1.
2 WILLISTON, SALES Acr § 235 (3d ed. 1948).
"s Wis. Stats., 121.15 (5) (1949), "An implied warranty or condition as to quality
of fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by usage of the trade."14 Bastian-Blessing Co. v. Stroope, 203 Ark. 116, 155 S.W. (2d) 892 (1941).
1 WILLISTON, SALES AcT § 232 (3d ed. 1948) ; Cavanagh v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
308 Mass. 423, 32 N.E. (2d) 256 (1941).
a6226 F. 646 (1915).
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in the sale of used coal barges which sunk immediately after the sale,
the court said:
"Such implied warranty of fitness would not be that they were
equal in quality to new, and would not extend to the length
of time they would last, but would be satisfied if they were
presently seaworthy."
Thus, the fitness for purpose and the duration of the warranty both
depend upon the facts, and the fact that the article is used is important
in determination of these questions. It does not seem that the inclu-
sion of used goods within the coverage of the sales act will affect to
any great extent the previous relations established in sales of used
goods.
IRVING W. ZmEEL
Torts- Scope of Employment Under the Federal Tort Claims Act -
Plaintiffs, the husband and three children of the deceased, brought an
action against the United States of America under the Federal Tort
Claims Act to recover for the death of the deceased who was struck by
an army truck driven by a soldier of the United States Army. The sol-
dier had taken the truck under the authority of his Commanding Officer
to convey other military personnel to town for entertainment. He then,
contrary to instructions, used the vehicle for his own personal business.
It was while he was in pursuit of his own affairs that the accident oc-
cured. His negligence was conceded. The trial court held that the
soldier was not acting within the scope of his employment and ren-
dered a judgment for the defendant. Held: Judgment reversed. The
military personnel were taken into town to improve their morale. The
soldier involved here was in search of entertainment to improve his
morale. Improvement of morale of a single soldier is as much military
in character as improvement in morale of several. Therefore the use
of the truck to improve his morale was within the scope of his employ-
ment. Murphy et al v. United States, 179 F. (2d) 743 (C.C.A. 9th,
1950).
The pertinent provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act are:
. . The district court.., shall have ... jurisdiction to ... render
judgment ... against the United States... on account of personal in-
jury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable.., in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occured."'I
1 1948 Revised Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 1346.
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